Why Not Storm the Ships?

After my MSNBC and NPR appearance (yes, a shameless self-promoting plug!) to discuss Somali piracy, I've gotten some queries as to why the U.S. and/or other Navies don't just retake hijacked ships by force. Well, there's a good economic reason why, for the last number of years, companies have preferred to pay ransom. Generally, companies prefer getting their ship and cargo back in one piece rather than risk destruction--and because the pirates, as of yet, don't seek to kill the crews (although there have been accidental deaths from bullet wounds during the initial takeover and a sailor on the Ukrainian vessel that was seized in September had a coronary)--there is no sense that the captured sailors are in imminent danger of death.

When it comes to the SS Faina and the MV Sirius Star (the arms ship and the oil tanker, respectively)--there are also environmental concerns. Especially with the oil tanker, no one wants a major oil spill contaminating the Red Sea and/or Gulf of Aden, or to have the ship vent oil and then to have it ignited. So the strategy is one of patience, at this point.

Going ashore to attack the pirate haven itself? Politicians will have to decide if they want to commit ground and air forces for such an assault.

It is interesting to note that the historical comparison with the Barbary Pirates gives us both models--force and accommodation. President Washington, for instance, did negotiate tribute arrangements to protect American shipping. Even after the "shores of Tripoli" incident, the U.S. would alternate between using the stick and the carrot.

There has been some interesting discussion about the possible applicability of the Petraeus model--an approach to tribal elders in the coastal villages about forming "sons of Somalia" groups that might be paid to act as "coastal security"--whether there might be impetus for such a move remains to be seen.